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2It has been 25 years since I last attended a meeting of the American Nuclear Society, in
this very hotel (although I believe it was then known as the Sheraton Park).  Although
the hotel name has changed, the faces in the audience have not.  A bit more gray; and
in fact a lot less hair–but after all these years, you are still energetic and attentive, and
perhaps even a bit wiser for the wear.  I’ve also seen lots of water over the dam since
the 1970s–serving as a dean of engineering, a university president, a member and chair
of the National Science Board, a council member of the National Academy of
Engineering, and even as chair of the Big Ten Athletic Conference.  This afternoon I
wear still another hat, as chairman of the Nuclear Energy Research Advisory Committee
(NERAC) of the Department of Energy.
The Nuclear Energy Research Advisory Committee
As you may be aware, NERAC was established in 1998 to provide independent advice
to the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) on complex science and technical issues that
arise in the planning, managing, and implementation of DOE's nuclear energy program.
The formation and activities of NERAC are directly related to the concern about the
future of this nation’s capability in nuclear energy technology expressed in a 1997 report
of the Energy R&D Panel of the President’s Council of Advisors on Science Technology
(PCAST).  The Council noted that the federal government’s investment in research and
development of nuclear technology declined substantially in the 1980’s and 1990’s and
programs such as the Advanced Light Water Reactor program and Integral Fast Breeder
Reactor were completed or phased out.  In fact, by 1998, the funding for nuclear R&D
had declined to zero, prompting the PCAST panel to note:
“Fission’s future expandability is in doubt in the United States and many
other regions of the world because of concerns about high costs, reactor-
accident risks, radioactive-waste management, and potential links to the
spread of nuclear weapons.  We believe that the potential benefits of an
expanded contribution from fission in helping address the carbon dioxide
challenge warrant the modest research initiative proposed here (the
Nuclear Energy Research Initiative), in order to find out whether and how
improved technology could alleviate the concerns that cloud this energy
option’s future.  To write off fission now as some have suggested, instead
3of trying to fix it where it is impaired, would be imprudent in energy terms
and would risk losing much U.S. influence over the safety and
proliferation resistance of nuclear energy in other countries.  Fission
belongs in the R&D portfolio.”
Of related concern was the erosion in academic programs and facilities necessary to
produce the human resources needed by the nation’s nuclear industry and nuclear
defense programs.  Over the past decade the number of nuclear engineering programs
in this country have declined by half (from 80 to 40), the number of university research
and training reactors by two-thirds (from 76 to 28), and enrollments have dropped by
almost 60% (from 3,350                  to 1,378).  As noted in a recent planning study:
“Nuclear engineering programs in the United States are disappearing.
Without concerted action by DOE, supported by OMB and the Congress,
most of the existing nuclear engineering programs will soon evaporate or
be absorbed and diffused in other engineering disciplines.”
PCAST expressed its concern that the decline in federal investment in the
development of intellectual and human had eroded the nation’s capabilities in
nuclear technology and threatened the availability of the nuclear option for
meeting 21st Century energy needs.  To this end, it strongly recommended a
restoration of federal investment within the context of a long-range research and
human resource development plan.  The Department of Energy created the
Nuclear Energy Research Advisory Committee to assist in this effort.
More specifically, NERAC assists DOE by reviewing the research and development
(R&D) activities of the Office of Nuclear Energy, Science and Technology (NE) and
providing advice and recommendations on long-range plans, priorities, and strategies to
effectively address the scientific and engineering aspects of these efforts.  In addition,
the committee provides independent advice on national policy and scientific aspects on
nuclear energy research issues as requested by the Secretary of Energy or the Director,
NE.  The committee operates in accordance with the Federal Advisory Committee Act
(FACA) and has a diverse membership with a balance of disciplines, interests,
experiences, points of view, and geography from academia, industry, and national
4laboratory communities.  A list of the current membership of the Committee is provided
as an appendix to my testimony
Last year DOE requested that NERAC assist the Department in developing a long-term
nuclear energy R&D plan, identifying priorities and possible programs along with an
assessment of funding and infrastructure needs.  Furthermore, the Committee was also
tasked to evaluate DOE’s physical infrastructure for nuclear energy research (e.g.,
research reactors, hot cells, and accelerators) in light of the needs suggested by the
long range nuclear energy R&D plan.  In addition, NERAC was asked to assess the
current crisis in university nuclear engineering programs and campus-based research
facilities in light of the growing human resources needs of the nation.
To conduct these long range planning activities and provide timely advice concerning
ongoing or proposed DOE programs in nuclear energy research, NERAC works through
a series of subcommittees:
Long-Range Nuclear Technology Research and Development Plan
Nuclear Science and Technology Infrastructure Roadmap Committee
Long Term Isotope Research and Production Plan Subcommittee
NERAC Blue Ribbon Panel on the Future of University Nuclear
Engineering Programs and University Research Reactors
Technology Opportunities for Increasing the Proliferation Resistance
For Civilian Nuclear Power Systems (TOPS) Task Force
Accelerator Transmutation of Waste Subcommittee
Operating Nuclear Power Plant Research, Coordination, and Planning
Subcommittee 
Generation IV Reactor R&D Planning Subcommittee
To address these concerns, NERAC, through its various subcommittees, has
undertaken over the past two years a major planning effort to determine the investments
in human resources, research and technology, and infrastructure necessary to restore
the nation’s capability in nuclear energy.  In May we received the initial reports from our
various planning subcommittees.
5Principal Conclusions of the Long-Range Planning Activities
Although these planning efforts are intended to be ongoing and evolutionary, they do
provide a strong sense of priorities for DOE/NE in the years ahead.  Put simply, the
reports stress the importance of adequate investment in ideas (research), people
(education), and tools (facilities).  It is our believe that restoring an adequate investment
in the development of intellectual and human capital is the first key step the nation must
take to preserve its nuclear option.
Ideas:  There is an urgent sense that the nation must rapidly restore an adequate
investment in basic and applied research in nuclear energy if it is to sustain a viable
United States capability in the 21st Century.  The Long Range Planning Study has
recommended a set of program and funding priorities ramping to a level of $240 million
by FY2005, including a growth in funding of the Nuclear Energy Research Initiative
(NERI) to achieve the goals set by PCAST.  We anticipate that this would scale up to
levels more comparable to those characterizing the 1970s and 1980s as experimental
facilities are developed and demonstration projects are launched.  However NERAC
believes it important that during the early years, the focus be on developing a broad-
based research project rather than focusing prematurely on the development of specific
technologies or projects. It is also recommended that at least a part of this program
accommodate investigator-initiated basic research projects, selected on the basis of
scientific merit rather than confined to DOE programmatic needs.
Here it should be noted that NERAC believes that such funding levels are not only
necessary but realistic in view of the funding provided other DOE research programs
such as fossil energy ($293 M in FY 2001), renewable energy ($410 M), nuclear physics
($360 M), and high energy physics ($708 M).
People:  The report of the Long Range Planning Subcommittee reflects the views both of
the other committees and NERAC membership when it states: “Perhaps the most
important role for DOE/NE in the nuclear energy area at the present time is to insure that
the education system and its facility infrastructure are in good shape.”  It is clear that
United States nuclear engineering programs and university reactor facilities are at great
risk and require immediate and concerted attention in DOE funding priorities.  The
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concerning the nature of DOE programs and support necessary to preserve and
strengthen these important national resources.  In particular, the Panel recommends an
increase of the Nuclear Engineering Educational Research (NEER) program to $20 M/y,
a new competitive research grant aimed at sustaining university research reactors at a
level of $15 M/y, and a graduate fellowship/traineeship program at $5 M/y.  The Panel
believes that the plight of nuclear engineering education in this nation is sufficiently
serious that the Department should take substantial steps in its FY2002 budget request
to move toward these targets.
Tools:  Finally, the Long Range Planning subcommittee, Infrastructure Roadmapping
Subcommittee, and the Isotope Subcommittee stress the need for DOE facilities to
sustain the nuclear energy research mission in the years ahead. Of particular need over
the longer term are dependable sources of research isotopes and reactor facilities
providing high volume flux irradiation for nuclear fuels and materials testing.  NERAC
recognizes the serious funding and policy issues associated with such facilities
(including the use of existing facilities such as FFTF).  However it is also important to
state NERAC’s view that without an adequate investment in basic and applied research
programs and in human resource development, such expensive facilities will be useless.
Again put most simply, the tools are useless without the people and ideas to make use
of them.  NERAC believes that these priorities should–indeed, must–guide the
Department of Energy’s and Administration’s funding requests for DOE/NE.  The most
important needs of the nation at this critical juncture are the intellectual capital and
human resources necessary to strengthen and sustain our capacity in nuclear
technology
It is important to recognize that these reports represent the efforts, consideration, and
wisdom not only of NERAC committee members but as well of the hundreds of members
of the broader scientific and engineering community who participated in the various
workshops and drafting sessions associated with these studies.  As such we believe that
the Department of Energy, the Administration, and the Congress should give careful
consideration and significant weight to the recommendations in these reports as they
frame the programmatic planning and funding requests for the nuclear energy research
activities of the Department of Energy.
7Investing in the Future
Before closing, let me offer some more informal observations.  I’m from Missouri, where
we have a saying that to get a mule to move, sometimes you have to first whack it over
the head with a 2x4 to get its attention.  Well, I’m going to set aside my hat as chair of
NERAC, and instead speak both as a former university president and former chair of the
National Science Board to serve as a 2x4 to get the attention of the American Nuclear
Society.
We’ve had several discussions this afternoon portraying an optimistic future for nuclear
power in the century ahead, driven both by growing environmental concerns about the
burning of fossil fuels and the growing energy needs of our planet, particularly driven by
the needs of developing nations.  Yet I fear that all of this optimism may be just so much
wishful thinking.
The future of nuclear power today is symbolized by empty college classrooms and
discontinued nuclear engineering programs, by decommissioned university reactors, and
by students turning away from nuclear science and engineering to major in areas such
as software engineering and biotechnology, where they see the real action.  We simply
must face reality.  We in this room are a group of graying nuclear scientists, engineers,
and executives that seem to have forgotten that the future of this technology will not be
determined by us, but by the next generation of scientists, engineers, and leaders.  And
yet, as governments, industry, and universities, we simply have not made the necessary
investments during the past two decades to create this new generation.
Let me give you two examples.  First, consider the R&D budget of the Department of
Energy.  In FY 2001 the Department will spend:
$3.0 billion on research of its Office of Science
$3.7 billion on defense R&D
$1.3 billion on energy R&D (mostly renewables)
$1.1 billion on higher energy physics and nuclear physics
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education?  $12 million!  About 1% of what it is planning to spend on physicists chasing
the Higgs boson!
Beyond that comparison, I would note that while most research budgets of the
Department of Energy grew by 10% to 14% this year, for the third year in a row the
nuclear science and engineering budget remained frozen at $12 million.  Its growth was
zero.
Ironically, in the summer of 1999 and again in 2000, NERAC conveyed to the
Department its highest priority recommendation that adequate funding be provided to
these university programs.  And what was the administration’s response?
Procrastination … and a deaf ear.
We made the same recommendations to Congress.  The same result:  no action.
As a consequence in 2001 we will have even fewer academic programs, fewer campus-
based nuclear facilities, fewer students, and even more damage to this nation’s nuclear
technology capabilities.
Let me offer a second example:  Education and research in nuclear science and
engineering depend heavily on access to nuclear facilities, e.g., nuclear reactors, hot
cells, accelerators, and the like.  Over the decades, universities have made very
substantial investments in developing and supporting campus-based nuclear reactors to
sustain not only nuclear engineering programs but as well to provide support for many
other areas of scientific research and training.  Although these facilities were initially
stimulated, encouraged, and supported by the Department of Energy (and its
predecessor, the Atomic Energy Commission), federal support has dropped dramatically
over the years, now consisting of roughly $2.8 million per year for fuel subsidy and
another $1.5 million for limited support.  Yet both the operating costs carried by
universities and the projected costs of modernizing these facilities so that they are
adequate for contemporary research and training are forcing universities, one by one, to
decide that without Department of Energy support, it is simply not worth the expenditure
in the face of other more urgent campus priorities.  And one by one, these facilities are
being closed down, dropping from 76 in number in the 1970s to 28 today.  And we have
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programs in the nation, MIT, Cornell, and Michigan will likely be forced to close their
reactor facilities.
The irony is that for a small investment, amounting to $10 million per year or less, the
Department of Energy could keep a significant number of university reactor facilities
open as national resources.  But instead it chooses to spend $44 million per year to
keep sacred cows such as the Fast Flux Test Facility on life support (and perhaps even
to resuscitate it at a considerably higher cost), while allowing university reactors, which
are far more valuable for training and research purposes, to die, one by one.
Let me be very clear about the urgency of this matter.  Unless the Department of Energy
reprograms funding in FY 2001 and places a priority in its FY2002 budget to provide
support for these university reactor facilities, a domino chain of closures will occur over
the next several years eliminating most nuclear facilities on university campuses.  Of
course, one could argue that it might be better if all of the university reactors were
closed, and one (or several) major national facilities were built for education and
research.  But, this should be a strategic decision rather than a consequence of benign
neglect.
Let me conclude with the conclusion stated in an executive summary of a report by the
Nuclear Energy Agency of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development:
“Today nuclear technology is widespread and multidisciplinary.  Yet the
advancement of this technology, with all its associated benefits, will be
threatened, even curtailed, unless the declining number of university
courses associated with it, and the declining interest among students in it,
is arrested. In most countries there are now fewer comprehensive, high
quality nuclear technology programs at universities than before. The
ability of universities to attract top quality students to these programs,
meet future staffing requirements of the nuclear industry, and conduct
leading edge research in nuclear topics is becoming seriously
compromised.
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“Failure to take appropriate steps now will seriously jeopardize the
provision of adequate expertise tomorrow.  Governments should
contribute to, if not take responsibility for, integrated planning to ensure
that human resources are available to meet necessary obligations and
address outstanding issues.”
Let me put my conclusion another way:  It is time for us to stop talking about the future,
and instead to start investing in it.  By investing first in our people, our human capital,
and then in new knowledge, our intellectual capital, we can take important steps toward
a future of sustained capability in nuclear technology.
